Number
152
Author
chisana
Created
Thread
http://zzz.i2p/topics/2737
Last updated
Status
Open

Overview

This document is a specification proposal for changes to Tunnel encryption and message processing using crypto primitives introduced by [ECIES-X25519].

For the purposes of transitioning the network from ElGamal + AES256 to ECIES + ChaCha20, tunnels with mixed ElGamal and ECIES routers are necessary.

Specifications for how to handle mixed tunnel hops are provided.

No changes will be made to the format, processing, or encryption of ElGamal hops.

ElGamal tunnel creators will need to create ephemeral X25519 keypairs per-hop, and follow this spec for creating tunnels containing ECIES hops.

The proposal is split into two sections:

  • ECIES for Tunnel Building
  • ECIES for Tunnel Layer Encryption

If necessary, the proposal can be split into independent proposals for separate analysis and adoption.

Cryptographic Primitives

ECIES for Tunnel Building

Goals

Replace ElGamal + AES256/CBC with ECIES primitives for tunnel BuildRequestRecords and BuildReplyRecords.

Tunnel Request Records for ECIES Hops

Request Record Spec Unencrypted (ElGamal)

bytes     0-3: tunnel ID to receive messages as, nonzero
bytes    4-35: local router identity hash
bytes   36-39: next tunnel ID, nonzero
bytes   40-71: next router identity hash
bytes  72-103: AES-256 tunnel layer key
bytes 104-135: AES-256 tunnel IV key
bytes 136-167: AES-256 reply key
bytes 168-183: AES-256 reply IV
byte      184: flags
bytes 185-188: request time (in hours since the epoch, rounded down)
bytes 189-192: next message ID
bytes 193-221: uninterpreted / random padding
bytes 222-253: Sha256 of the preceding data

Request Record Spec Unencrypted (ECIES)

bytes     0-3: tunnel ID to receive messages as, nonzero
bytes    4-35: local router identity hash
bytes   36-39: next tunnel ID, nonzero
bytes   40-71: next router identity hash
byte       72: flags
bytes   73-76: request time (in hours since the epoch, rounded down)
bytes   77-80: next message ID
bytes  81-464: tunnel build options / random padding

The tunnel build options block will be defined by [Tunnel-Build-Options].

Request Record Spec Encrypted (ECIES)

bytes    0-15: hop's truncated identity hash
bytes   16-47: sender's ephemeral public key
bytes  48-511: ChaChaPoly AEAD encrypted BuildRequestRecord
bytes 512-527: Poly1305 MAC

After full transition to ECIES records, bytes 129-527 can be a range of included padding.

Random padding will be formatted using the Padding block structure from [ECIES-X25519] and [NTCP2].

Flag Changes for Mixed Tunnels

Bit order: 76543210 (bit 7 is MSB)
bit 7: if set, allow messages from anyone
bit 6: if set, allow messages to anyone, and send the reply to the
       specified next hop in a Tunnel Build Reply Message
bit 5: if set, only ECIES hops in the tunnel, use Blowfish+ChaCha20 layer encryption
bits 4-0: Undefined, must set to 0 for compatibility with future options

Tunnel Reply Records for ECIES

Reply Record Spec Unencrypted (ECIES)

bytes      0: Reply byte
bytes  1-511: Tunnel Build Options / Random padding

For options formatting refer to the [Tunnel-Build-Options] spec.

Reply flags for ECIES reply records should use the following values to avoid fingerprinting:

  • 0x00 (accept)
  • 30 (TUNNEL_REJECT_BANDWIDTH)

Reply Record Spec Encrypted (ECIES)

bytes     0-511: ChaChaPoly AEAD encrypted BuildReplyRecord
bytes 512-527: Poly1305 MAC

After full transition to ECIES records, ranged padding rules are the same as for request records.

Symmetric Encryption of Asymmetrically Encrypted Records

Mixed tunnels are allowed, and necessary, for full network transition from ElGamal to ECIES. During the transitionary period, a statistically increasing number of routers will be keyed under ECIES keys.

Symmetric cryptography preprocessing will run in the same way:

  • "encryption":
    • cipher run in decryption mode
    • request records preemptively decrypted in preprocessing (concealing encrypted request records)
  • "decryption":
    • cipher run in encryption mode
    • request records encrypted (revealing next plaintext request record) by participant hops
  • ChaCha20 does not have "modes", so it is simply run three times:
    • once in preprocessing
    • once by the hop
    • once on final reply processing

When mixed tunnels are used, tunnel creators will need to base the symmetric encryption of BuildRequestRecord on the current and previous hop's encryption type.

Each hop will use it's own encryption type for encrypting BuildReplyRecords, and the other records in the VariableTunnelBuildMessage (VTBM).

On the reply path, the endpoint (sender) will need to undo the [Multiple-Encryption], using each hop's reply key.

As a clarifying example, let's look at an outbound tunnel w/ ECIES surrounded by ElGamal:

  • Sender (OBGW) -> ElGamal (H1) -> ECIES (H2) -> ElGamal (H3)

All BuildRequestRecords are in their encrypted state (using ElGamal or ECIES).

AES256/CBC cipher, when used, is still used for each record, without chaining across multiple records.

Likewise, ChaCha20 will be used to encrypt each record, not streaming across the entire VTBM.

The request records are preprocessed by the Sender (OBGW):

  • H3's record is "encrypted" using:
    • H2's reply key (ChaCha20)
    • H1's reply key (AES256/CBC)
  • H2's record is "encrypted" using:
    • H1's reply key (AES256/CBC)
  • H1's record goes out without symmetric encryption

Only H2 checks the reply encryption flag, and sees its followed by AES256/CBC.

After being processed by each hop, the records are in a "decrypted" state:

  • H3's record is "decrypted" using:
    • H3's reply key (AES256/CBC)
  • H2's record is "decrypted" using:
    • H3's reply key (AES256/CBC)
    • H2's reply key (ChaCha20-Poly1305)
  • H1's record is "decrypted" using:
    • H3's reply key (AES256/CBC)
    • H2's reply key (ChaCha20)
    • H1's reply key (AES256/CBC)

The tunnel creator, a.k.a. Inbound Endpoint (IBEP), postprocesses the reply:

  • H3's record is "encrypted" using:
    • H3's reply key (AES256/CBC)
  • H2's record is "encrypted" using:
    • H3's reply key (AES256/CBC)
    • H2's reply key (ChaCha20-Poly1305)
  • H1's record is "encrypted" using:
    • H3's reply key (AES256/CBC)
    • H2's reply key (ChaCha20)
    • H1's reply key (AES256/CBC)

Request Record Key, Reply Key, Tunnel Layer Key, and IV Key KDF (ECIES)

The recordKey takes the place of the product of the ElGamal exchange. It is used to AEAD encrypt request records for ECIES hops.

Below is a description of how to derive the keys previously transmitted in request records.

// Sender generates an X25519 ephemeral keypair per ECIES hop in the VTBM (sesk, sepk)
sesk = GENERATE_PRIVATE()
sepk = DERIVE_PUBLIC(sesk)

// Each hop's X25519 static keypair (hesk, hepk), generated for NTCP2 RouterInfos and LeaseSet2s
hesk = GENERATE_PRIVATE()
hepk = DERIVE_PUBLIC(hesk)

// Sender performs an X25519 DH with Hop's static public key.
// Each Hop, finds the record w/ their truncated identity hash,
// and extracts the Sender's ephemeral key preceding the encrypted record.
sharedSecret = DH(sesk, hepk) = DH(hesk, sepk)

// Derive a root key from the Sha256 of Sender's ephemeral key and Hop's full identity hash
rootKey = Sha256(sepk \|\| hop_ident_hash)

keydata = HKDF(rootKey, sharedSecret, "ECIESRequestRcrd", 96)
rootKey = keydata[0:31]  // update the root key
recordKey = keydata[32:63]  // AEAD key for Request Record encryption
replyKey = keydata[64:95]  // Hop reply key

keydata = HKDF(rootKey, sharedSecret, "TunnelLayerIVKey", 96)
rootKey = keydata[0:31]  // update the root key
layerKey = keydata[32:63]  // Tunnel layer key
IVKey = keydata[64:96]  // Tunnel IV/nonce key

replyKey, layerKey and IVKey must still be included inside ElGamal records, and can be generated randomly. For ElGamal, the recordKey is not needed, since the tunnel creator can directly encrypt to an ElGamal hop's public key.

Keys are omitted from ECIES records (since they can be derived at the hop).

BuildRequestRecord Encryption for ECIES Hops

// See record key KDF for key generation
// Repeat for each ECIES hop record in the VTBM
(ciphertext, mac) = ChaCha20-Poly1305(msg = unencrypted record, nonce = 0, AD = Sha256(hop's recordKey), key = hop's recordKey)
encryptedRecord = ciphertext \|\| MAC

For subsequent records past the initial hop, pre-emptively decrypt for each preceding hop in the tunnel

// If the preceding hop is ECIES:
nonce = one \+ zero-indexed order of record in the VariableTunnelBuildMessage
key = replyKey of preceding hop
symCiphertext = ChaCha20(msg = encryptedRecord, nonce, key)

// If the preceding hop is ElGamal:
IV = reply IV of preceding hop
key = reply key of preceding hop
symCiphertext = AES256/CBC-Decrypt(msg = encryptedRecord, IV, key) 

Request Record Encryption from ElGamal + ECIES Tunnel Creators

ElGamal tunnel creators will need to generate an ephemeral X25519 keypair for each ECIES hop in the tunnel, and use scheme above for encrypting their BuildRequestRecord. ElGamal tunnel creators will use the scheme prior to this spec for encrypting to ElGamal hops.

ECIES tunnel creators will need to encrypt to the ElGamal hop's public key using the scheme prior to this spec. ECIES tunnel creators will use the above scheme for encrypting to ECIES hops.

This means that tunnel hops will only see encrypted records from their same encryption type.

For ElGamal and ECIES tunnel creators, they will generate unique ephemeral X25519 keypairs per-hop for encrypting to ECIES hops.

WARNING: if the same ephemeral keypair is used for more than one hop, it can only be used for at most two hops, and the hops must be consecutive.

WARNING: Using the same ephemeral keys for non-consecutive hops, or more than two hops, allows colluding hops to know they're in the same tunnel, VERY BAD!!!

Reply Record Encryption for ECIES Hops

The nonce must be unique per ChaCha20/ChaCha20-Poly1305 invocation using the same key.

See [RFC-7539-S4] Security Considerations for more information.

// See reply key KDF for key generation
msg = reply byte \|\| build options \|\| random padding
(ciphertext, MAC) = ChaCha20-Poly1305(msg, nonce = 0, AD = Sha256(replyKey), key = replyKey)

// Other request/reply record encryption
// Use a unique nonce per-record
nonce = one \+ number of records \+ zero-indexed order of record in the VariableTunnelBuildMessage
symCiphertext = ChaCha20(msg = multiple encrypted record, nonce, key = replyKey)

While mixed tunnels are used, reply records are the same size, though the format is different.

After full transition to ECIES, random padding can be a range of included padding.

When ranged padding is used, random padding will be formatted using the Padding block structure from [ECIES-X25519] and [NTCP2].

For symmetric encryption by other hops, it's necessary to know full record length (w/ padding) without asymmetric decryption.

When/if records become variable-length, it may become necessary to include an unencrypted Data block header before each record, TBD.

BuildReplyRecord may or may not need to match BuildRequestRecord length if both are preceded by Data block header, TBD.

Reply Record Encryption for ElGamal Hops

There are no changes for how ElGamal hops encrypt their replies.

Security Analysis for ECIES + ChaCha20 Tunnel Build Encryption

ElGamal does not provide forward-secrecy for Tunnel Build Messages.

AES256/CBC is in slightly better standing, only being vulnerable to a theoretical weakening from a known plaintext biclique attack.

The only known practical attack against AES256/CBC is a padding oracle attack, when the IV is known to the attacker.

An attacker would need to break the next hop's ElGamal encryption to gain the AES256/CBC key info (reply key and IV).

ElGamal is significantly more CPU-intensive than ECIES, leading to potential resource exhaustion.

ECIES, used with new ephemeral keys per-BuildRequestRecord or VariableTunnelBuildMessage, provides forward-secrecy.

ChaCha20Poly1305 provides AEAD encryption, allowing the recipient to verify message integrity before attempting decryption.

ECIES Tunnel Layer Encryption

Goals

The goal of this section is to replace AES256/ECB+CBC with Blowfish+ChaCha20 for established tunnel IV and layer encryption.

Established Tunnel Message Processing

This section describes changes to:

  • Outbound and Inbound Gateway preprocessing + encryption
  • Participant encryption + postprocessing
  • Outbound and Inbound Endpoint encryption + postprocessing

Changes are for mixed tunnels, and ElGamal hops are considered unchanged.

For an overview of current tunnel message processing, see the [Tunnel-Implementation] spec.

Only changes for ECIES gateways + hops are discussed.

No changes are considered for mixed tunnel with ElGamal routers, until a safe protocol can be devised for converting a 128-bit AES IV to a 64-bit ChaCha20 nonce. Bloom filters guarantee uniqueness for the full IV, but the first half of unique IVs could be identical.

This means ECIES routers will use current AES tunnel layer encryption whenever ElGamal hops are present in the tunnel.

See section on build request records for ECIES hop detection of ElGamal tunnel creators.

Gateway and Tunnel Creator Message Processing

Gateways will fragment and bundle messages in the same way.

AEAD frames (including the MAC) can be split across fragments, but any dropped fragments will result in failed AEAD decryption (failed MAC verification).

Gateway Preprocessing & Encryption

When tunnels are ECIES-only, gateways will generate 64-bit nonces for use by ECIES hops.

Inbound tunnels:

  • Encrypt the IV and tunnel message(s) using ChaCha20
  • Use 8-byte tunnelNonce given the lifetime of tunnels
  • Destroy tunnel before 2^(64/2 - 1) messages: 2^31 = 2,147,483,648
    • Nonce limit in place to avoid [Sweet32] attack on [Blowfish]
    • Nonce limit unlikely to ever be reached, given this would be ~3,579,139 msgs/second for 10 minute tunnels
    • Nonce cannot be truncated. For shorter nonce, a different method must be used with smaller state space.

The tunnel's Inbound Gateway (IBGW), processes messages received from another tunnel's Outbound Endpoint (OBEP).

At this point, the outermost message layer is encrypted using point-to-point transport encryption. The I2NP message headers are visible, at the tunnel layer, to the OBEP and IBGW. The inner I2NP messsages are wrapped in Garlic cloves, encrypted using end-to-end session encryption.

The IBGW preprocesses the messages into the appropriately formatted tunnel messages, and encrypts as following:

// For ECIES-only tunnels
// IBGW generates a random nonce, ensuring no collision in its Bloom filter
tunnelNonce = Random(len = 64-bits)
// IBGW ChaCha20 "encrypts" the preprocessed tunnel messages with its tunnelNonce and layerKey
encMsg = ChaCha20(msg = tunnel msg(s), nonce = tunnelNonce, key = layerKey)

// For mixed tunnels w/ ElGamal hops (unchanged)
encIV = AES256/ECB-Encrypt(msg = prev. encIV, key = hop's IVKey)
encMsg = AES256/CBC-Encrypt(msg = tunnel msg(s), IV = encIV, key = hop's layerKey)
encIV2 = AES256/ECB-Encrypt(msg = encIV, key = hop's IVKey)

Tunnel message format will slightly change, using an 8-byte nonce instead of a 16-byte IV. The rest of the format is unchanged.

Outbound tunnels:

For outbound tunnels, the tunnel creator is the Outbound Gateway (OBGW).

On outbound tunnel creation, Variable Tunnel Build Messages are created, preprocessed (iteratively decrypted), and sent out to the first potential hop in the tunnel.

Replies are directed to a zero-hop or existing inbound tunnel's IBGW.

  • Iteratively decrypt tunnel messages
    • ECIES-only tunnel hops will encrypt using Blowfish+ChaCha20
    • mixed-tunnel hops will encrypt using AES256/ECB+CBC
  • Use the same rules for IV and layer nonces as Inbound tunnels
// For ECIES-only tunnel hops
// For each hop, Blowfish-Decrypt the previous tunnelNonce with the current hop's Blowfish keys
tunnelNonce = Blowfish-Decrypt(msg = prev. tunnelNonce, key = IVKey)
// For each hop, ChaCha20 "decrypt" the tunnel message with the current hop's tunnelNonce and layerKey
decMsg = ChaCha20(msg = tunnel msg(s), nonce = tunnelNonce, key = hop's layerKey)

// For ElGamal hops (unchanged)
// Tunnel creator generates a random IV
// For each hop, decrypt the IV and tunnel message(s)
// For the first hop, the previous decrypted IV will be the randomly generated IV
decIV = AES256/ECB-Decrypt(msg = prev. decIV, key = hop's IVKey)
decMsg = AES256/CBC-Decrypt(msg = tunnel msg(s), IV = decIV, key = hop's layerKey)
decIV2 = AES256/ECB-Decrypt(msg = decIV, key = hop's IVKey)

Participant Processing

Participants will track seen messages in the same way, using decaying Bloom filters.

IV double-encryption is no longer necessary for ECIES hops, since there are no padding-oracle attacks against ChaCha20.

ChaCha20 hops will encrypt the received nonce to prevent confirmation attacks between prior and later hops, i.e. colluding, non-consecutive hops being able to tell they belong to the same tunnel.

IV double-encryption will still be used for mixed-tunnel hops, since they are considered unchanged.

To validate received tunnelNonce, the participant checks against its Bloom filter for duplicates.

After validation, the participant:

  • [Blowfish] encrypts the tunnelNonce with its IVKey
  • Uses the encrypted tunnelNonce & its layerKey to ChaCha20 encrypt the tunnel message(s)
  • Sends the tuple {tunnelId, encrypted tunnelNonce, ciphertext} to the next hop.
// For ECIES-only tunnel hops
// For verification, tunnel participant should check Bloom filter for received nonce uniqueness
// After verification, Blowfish encrypt the tunnelNonce with the hop's IVKey
tunnelNonce = Blowfish-Encrypt(msg = received tunnelNonce, key = IVKey)
encMsg = ChaCha20(msg = received message, nonce = tunnelNonce, key = layerKey)

// For ElGamal hops (unchanged)
currentIV = AES256/ECB-Encrypt(msg = received IV, key = hop's IVKey)
encMsg = AES256/CBC-Encrypt(msg = tunnel msg(s), IV = currentIV, key = hop's layerKey)
nextIV = AES256/ECB-Encrypt(msg = currentIV, key = hop's IVKey)

Inbound Endpoint Processing

Inbound Endpoints will check the composition of their tunnel hops (ECIES or ElGamal).

Mixed tunnels are considered unchanged for tunnel layer encryption.

For ECIES-only tunnels, the following scheme will be used:

  • Validate the received tunnelNonce against the Bloom filter
  • ChaCha20 decrypt the encrypted data using the received tunnelNonce & the hop's layerKey
  • [Blowfish] decrypt the tunnelNonce using the hop's IVKey to get the preceding tunnelNonce
  • ChaCha20 decrypt the encrypted data using the decrypted tunnelNonce & the preceding hop's layerKey
  • Repeat for each hop in the tunnel, back to the IBGW
// For ECIES-only tunnel hops
// Repeat for each hop in the tunnel back to the IBGW
// Replace the received tunnelNonce w/ the prior round hop's decrypted tunnelNonce for subsequent hops
tunnelNonce = Blowfish-Decrypt(msg = received tunnelNonce, key = IVKey)
decMsg(s) = ChaCha20(msg = encrypted layer message(s), nonce = tunnelNonce, key = layerKey)

// For mixed tunnel hops (unchanged)
// Repeat for each hop in the tunnel back to the IBGW
// Replace the received IV w/ the prior round hop's double-decrypted IV for subsequent hops
decIV = AES256/ECB(msg = received IV, key = IVKey)
decMsg = AES256/CBC(msg = tunnel msg(s), IV = decIV, key = layerKey)
decIV2 = AES256/ECB(msg = decIV, key = IVKey)

Security Analysis for Blowfish+ChaCha20 Tunnel Layer Encryption

Switching from AES256/ECB to ChaCha20 has a number of advantages, and new security considerations.

The biggest security considerations to account for, are that ChaCha20 nonces must be unique per-message, for the life of the key being used, and [Blowfish] is susceptible to [Sweet32] birthday attacks.

Failing to use unique nonces with the same key on different messages breaks ChaCha20.

Nonce uniqueness is main reason for using an [Blowfish], see [RFC-7539-S4].

Simple counters cannot be used, since they require syncing for proper decryption. Syncing the counter can't be guaranteed at the IBEP, without further changes to tunnel protocols.

[Blowfish] is only used for nonce encryption to guarantee unique nonces, and prevent non-consecutive hops in the same tunnel from colluding to know they are in the same tunnel.

The tunnel lifetime of ten minutes and nonce limit of 2^31 messages guarantees that [Sweet32] attacks are ineffective against Blowfish. Exceeding the limit would require over ~3,579,139 messages/second in each tunnel.

Even if 2^31 messages proves to not be a strict enough limit, we can safely reduce the limit by another power of two, without ever realistically reaching the limit.

Even if a [Sweet32] attack were successful, an attacker would only gain access to the tunnelNonce for the colliding message, which doesn't break the ChaCha20 encryption. Non-consecutive hops would only be able to confirm they are participants in the same tunnel.

The biggest security advantage is that there are no confirmation or oracle attacks against ChaCha20.

There are chosen/known-plaintext attacks against AES256/ECB, when the key is reused (as in tunnel layer encryption).

It is unlikely the chosen-plaintext attack can be used to recover double-encrypted IVs, since it requires at least two blocks to be encrypted, and a single pass of the cipher.

An attack confirming a chosen plaintext IV is much more likely, but still unclear if it would be successful given double-encryption.

The chosen-plaintext producing a recovered IV cannot be used to perform a padding-oracle attack against AES256/CBC layer encryption, since duplicate IVs are rejected.

Justification for Blowfish

[Blowfish] is needed to symmetrically encrypt ChaCha20 nonces used in tunnel layer encryption. It was chosen for its 64-bit block size, and ability to symmetrically encrypt without using a nonce.

A 64-bit block size is needed to generate unique nonces for ChaCha20. ChaCha20 has a maximum nonce size of 96-bits, using the IETF variant. Nonces of smaller sizes can be used, and are padded with zeroes. However, larger nonces, like the 128-bit AES256/CBC IV cannot safely be truncated, as 96-bit segments may be identical for two otherwise unique IVs.

HKDF and other hashing functions cannot be used to safely truncate the received IV, since it must be possible for Inbound Endpoints to recover the IV of preceding hops in the tunnel.

Of the 64-bit ciphers, [Blowfish] is the most secure, with the widest support in well-audited cryptography libraries.

Other alternatives like DES and 3DES, are more cumbersome, and weaker in comparison. Despite its comparative strength, [Blowfish] is still vulnerable to [Sweet32] attacks. This means that in ~2^32 blocks, there will be a block collision, allowing for recovery of the nonce from that block. Given the lifetime of tunnels, the restriction on unique received nonces, and the limit of 2^31 messages, [Blowfish] would not vulnerable to [Sweet32] in the I2P ECIES Tunnels context.

Realistically, much fewer than 2^29 nonces will ever be seen by any tunnel, since this would be over 894,784 msgs/sec.

For comparison, Google receives ~76,000 searches per second. Even assuming 10 messages per search, a tunnel would have to be over 100,000 msgs/sec busier than Google. Vanishingly unlikely.

Statistics from: https://www.internetlivestats.com/one-second/

Tunnel Message Overhead for ECIES

Wrapped I2NP message overhead:

  • I2NP Block header: 3 (block type + size) + 9 (I2NP message header) = 12
  • New Session Message:
    • 25 (min payload len) + 16 (MAC) = 41
    • 32 (one-time key) + 40 (ephemeral section) + 16 (MAC) + 41 (min payload) = 129 unbound
    • 88 (unbound) + 32 (static section) + 16 (MAC) + 41 (min payload) = 177 bound
  • Existing Message: 8 (session tag) + payload len + 16 (MAC) = 24 + payload len
  • New session:
    • 12 (I2NP) + 129 (unbound) = 141 + payload
    • 12 (I2NP + 177 (bound) = 189 + payload
  • Existing Session: 12 (I2NP) + 24 = 36 + payload
  • Build Request Record: 528 (ElGamal, mixed tunnels)
  • Build Request Reply: 528 (ElGamal, mixed tunnels)

Tunnel message overhead:

Wrapped I2NP message overhead:

  • I2NP Block header: 3 (block type + size) + 9 (I2NP message header) = 12
  • New Session Message:
    • 25 (min payload len) + 16 (MAC) = 41
    • 32 (one-time key) + 40 (ephemeral section) + 16 (MAC) + 41 (min payload) = 129 unbound
    • 88 (unbound) + 32 (static section) + 16 (MAC) + 41 (min payload) = 177 bound
  • Existing Message: 8 (session tag) + payload len + 16 (MAC) = 24 + payload len
  • New session:
    • 12 (I2NP) + 129 (unbound) = 141 + payload
    • 12 (I2NP + 177 (bound) = 189 + payload
  • Existing Session: 12 (I2NP) + 24 = 36 + payload
  • Build Request Record: 528 (ElGamal, mixed tunnels)
  • Build Request Reply: 528 (ElGamal, mixed tunnels)

Tunnel message overhead:

Tunnel layer keys, IV keys, and reply keys no longer need to be transmitted in ECIES BuildRequest Records. Unused space claimed by random padding and the trailing 16 byte Poly1305 MAC.

ECIES session messages will be wrapped in I2NP Data messages, surrounded by a Garlic Clove, and fragmented in Tunnel Data messages like any other message.

Dropped fragments will result in AEAD decryption failure (fails MAC verification), resulting in the entire message being dropped.